Ou selon quels procédés le capitalisme non libéral chinois a transformé d’anciens villageois demeurant à Pinghu, proche de Shenzhen (10 millions d’habitants), en riches propriétaires terriens et immobiliers, qui vivent désormais de leurs rentes, dont la gestion a été confiée à des compagnies spécialisées … Bénéfices qui opèrent à l’exception notoire des travailleurs migrants chinois de l’intérieur, interdits de toutes transactions immobilières….
« New Trend of Urbanization in China: Land and Housing Development in Suburban Areas and Small Towns ». Author Ya Ping Wang. 2012 Lincoln Institute of Land Policy
Extraits du rapport de Ya Ping Wang (P 12 et suiv): “Pinghu is interesting here not for the creation of unplanned high-density and high-rise privately owned housing, but for what has happened afterward. Shenzhen has declared full urbanization in the whole area under its administration in 2005. The government had been actively promoting village redevelopment ever since.
Pinghu village took a very interesting approach to village redevelopment and housing improvement among its original residents.
When a piece of its farm land were acquired by a Hong Kong property developer for a new luxury commercial housing project, village leaders bargained with the municipal government for a neibghouring piece of farm land (collectively owned by the village) to be “taken over” by the government and then returned it to the village for new housing construction as part of village redevelopment plan.
This sounds very strange process actually legalized the use of the farmer land owned by the village for housing construction. Traditional village housing was tied up with the families and they were not tradable in the market (this is the so-called small property right housing). The process of “taking over” by the government and “returning” to the village changed the land ownership to the state and the housing constructed on it will have full property rights; owners could sell them in the open market whenever they like. In theory, only when villagers moved into this type of housing they can enjoy the full legal, socio-economic rights enjoyed by official urban residents. The physical environment of the estate and the management will also be the same as other commercially built housing estates in the city.
All families in the village (exclude migrant) were offered the chance to buy, and most of original village households moved into this estate. No migrant workers were allowed in the new village. Less than ten families were left behind in the old village because they could not find enough money to purchase the new flat. The village leaders also allowed a few non-villagers to purchase a property and live in the estate. These special guests were the industrial factory owners who rented the workshop spaces built by the village. They were given this privilege and honor because of “their special contributions to the village economy over the year (….) The estate is managed by a commercial property management company, not by the village resident themselves. Village leader indicated that this was a more efficient and cheaper way to look after the estate, as not many villagers would be interested in the hard work and low pay .”
Accéder au rapport complet : CHINE-urbanisation
Lire par ailleurs :
Should Beijing Control the Influx of Migrants? A Labor Market Analysis. The 2010 Census. Chengdong Yi, Youqing Huang, and Chuan Zhang © 2014 Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Extraits : » According to the latest 2010 census, migrants without local household registration accounted for more than one third of 19.6 million population in Beijing. This triggered again the heated debate on the proper population size of Beijing and whether the influx of migrants should be controlled. A review of migration policy in Beijing shows that the Beijing Municipal Government has remained the position of « controlling » and « managing » migration although the tactics have been more diversified and subtle in recent years (…) In other words, the influx of migrants has had positive impact on the labor market, thus the policy of controlling the influx of migrants in Beijing is baseless at least from the perspective of the labor market. »
- Pour d’autres lectures sur la situation immobilière en Chine, aller sur la page 2 du carnet CHAIRECOOP.
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ISSN N° 2494-8349